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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

The year 2008 marked the sixtieth anniversary of the
Genocide Convention and the tenth anniversary of the adoption of
the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (ICC): the
former was the groundbreaking international instrument aimed at
criminalizing the most serious of crimes in response to the terrible
atrocities of the Second World War; the latter, adopted after a halfcentury hiatus, established the very mechanism for enforcement of
the norm recalled in Article 6 of the Genocide Convention in its
reference to an “international penal tribunal” with jurisdiction.1
While the Court has only been functioning for a little over six
years and has yet to deliver a final judgment, the year witnessed a
range of significant decisions from the Pre-Trial, Trial and Appeals
Divisions of the Court. These decisions are helping to shape the
contours of the emerging jurisprudence of the ICC and are starting
to reveal the form the institution will take. A number of the most
significant developments of 2008 are treated below in summary
form to provide an overview of a number of jurisprudential
foundations upon which the Court will likely build in the
immediate years ahead. This includes an examination of further
developments before the Court in its approach towards modes of
liability, which diverges from theory of joint criminal enterprise
developed at the ad hoc Tribunals. Also reviewed are a number of
*

Ph.D. (LSE), LL.M. (Nottm); Legal Advisor, Office of the Prosecutor,
International Criminal Court. The views expressed herein are those of the author
and do not necessary reflect those of the Office of the Prosecutor or the ICC.
The author would like to thank Fabricio Guariglia, Ben Batros and Reinhold
Gallmetzer for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
1
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art.
vi, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12,
1951) (“Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in
Article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of
which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may
have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have
accepted its jurisdiction.”).
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decisions on procedural issues that have clarified in greater detail
such areas as the requirements of confidentiality and those of
disclosure; the application of the gravity criteria under the Statute’s
admissibility provisions; and the role of victims in pre-trial and
trial proceedings. The final section looks at the way the Court has
resorted to secondary sources of law to regulate aspects of its own
proceedings, as reflected in its rulings on witness proofing.
II. MODES OF LIABILITY
¶2

On September 30, 2008, Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) I
rendered its decision on the confirmation of charges in the case of
The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui,
arising from the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC).2 In this decision, the PTC recalled that the purpose of the
confirmation hearing is to ensure that there is sufficient evidence
for a case to proceed to trial. As the Chamber observed, “[t]his
mechanism is designed to protect the rights of the defence against
wrongful and wholly unfounded charges . . . the confirmation
hearing has a limited scope and purpose and should not be seen as
a ‘mini-trial’ or a ‘trial before the trial.’”3 The decision entered a
number of important findings, particularly in relation to the
admissibility and probative value of evidence admitted for the
purpose of meeting the confirmation threshold of substantial
grounds to believe.4 However, focus is given below to the
2

Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-717 (PreTrial Chamber I), Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Sept. 30, 2008).
Germain Katanga, alleged commander of the Force de résistance patriotique en
Ituri (FRPI), and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, alleged former leader of the Front des
nationalistes et intégrationnistes (FNI), are charged with criminal responsibility
for two charges of crimes against humanity: murder under article 7(1)(a) and
rape and sexual slavery under article 7(1)(g). Id. ¶¶ 420, 428 (citing Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signatures July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Statute or Rome Statute]). They are also charged
with the following war crimes: willful killings under article 8(2)(a)(i) of the
Statute; directing an attack against a civilian population as such or against
individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities under article 8(2)(b)(i);
destruction of property under article 8(2)(b)(xiii), pillaging under article
8(2)(b)(xvi); sexual slavery and rape under article 8(2)(b)(xxii); and using
children under the age of fifteen to take active part in the hostilities under article
8(2)(b)(xxvi). Id. ¶¶ 565-69.
3
Id. ¶¶ 63-64.
4
See id. ¶¶ 72-78.
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Chambers’ approach to modes of liability, given its potential role
in shaping the way future cases will be heard before the Court.
Following the interpretation developed by the same Chamber
in the Lubanga case, the PTC further elaborated its approach to
modes of liability based on the theory of “control over the crime.”
In the Lubanga case the PTC observed that when a crime is
committed by a plurality of persons, the Rome Statute separates
out the commission strictu senso of a crime by a person, i.e.
principal liability, committed as “an individual, jointly with
another or through another person” pursuant to Article 25(3)(a),
from the responsibility of accessories to a crime under Article
25(3)(b)-(d).5 The PTC went on to identify three main approaches
to distinguishing between principal and accessory forms of
participation for this purpose: (i) an objective approach, whereby
only those who physically carry out one or more of the objective
elements of the offense can be considered principals; (ii) a
subjective approach, which focuses principal liability on the intent
in which a contribution to the commission of crimes is made,
rather than the level thereof; and (iii) the concept of control over
the crime, by which the liability of principals is established not
only by reference to those who physically carry out the objective
elements of the crime, but also to those who, though removed from
the crime scene, control or mastermind its commission, because
they decide whether and how the offense will be committed.6
In its decision on the confirmation of charges in the Katanga
and Ngudjolo case, the PTC reiterated its finding that the Statute
excludes the objective approach as a basis for principal liability
given the inclusion within Article 25(3)(a) of commission “through
another person.” In other words, the Statute foresees the possibility
of a person who does not physically carry out the objective
elements of the offense being considered as a principal. Turning to
the subjective approach, which it characterized as the theory
adopted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise, the
PTC observed that a reading of principal liability based on the
intent of a group of persons to commit a crime would be
5

Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-803 (Pre-Trial Chamber I),
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 320 (Jan. 29, 2007) [hereinafter
Lubanga Decision on Confirmation of Charges].
6
Katanga & Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-717, ¶¶ 328-30, 482-84.
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inconsistent with the placement of the common purpose doctrine
under Article 25(3)(d), which it identified as an accessory mode of
liability.
By contrast, the PTC held that the notion of control over the
crime synthesizes both objective and subjective components.7 As
such, the PTC maintained that under Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute,
a principal is a person who:
a. physically carries out all elements of the
offence (commission of the crime as an
individual, i.e. perpetration);
b. has, together with others, control over the
offence by reason of the essential tasks
assigned to him (commission of the crime
jointly with others, i.e. co-perpetration); or
c. has control over the will of those who carry
out the objective elements of the offence
(commission of the crime through another
person, i.e. indirect perpetration).8

¶6

Applying this framework to the facts at hand in the Katanga
and Ngudjolo case, the PTC further expanded on the control over
the crime theory in its decision on the confirmation of charges. It
did so by combining two forms of commission under 25(3)(a)
which may independently give rise to criminal responsibility under
25(3)(a), namely co-perpetration and indirect perpetration, in order
to more fully capture the modes of participation that incur principal
liability under the Statute. As the PTC observed, “through a
combination of individual responsibility for committing crimes
through other persons together with the mutual attribution among
the co-perpetrators at the senior level, a mode of liability arises

7

Id. ¶ 484.
Id. ¶ 488. The PTC characterized indirect perpetration by reference to the
notion of the “perpetrator behind the perpetrator” (Täter hinter dem Täter), the
former controlling the will of the latter. Id. ¶ 496 (citing with approval CLAUS
ROXIN, STRAFTATEN IM RAHMEN ORGANISATORISCHER MACHTAPPARATE,
GOLTDAMMER’S ARCHIV FÜR STRAFRECHT 193-207 (1963)). The notion applies
irrespective of whether the physical perpetrator is also criminally responsible.
Id. ¶ 496.
8
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which allows the Court to assess the blameworthiness of 'senior
leaders' adequately.”9 The PTC went on to explain:
An individual who has no control over the person
through whom the crime would be committed
cannot be said to commit the crime by means of that
other person. However, if he acts jointly with
another individual — one who controls the person
used as an instrument — these crimes can be
attributed to him on the basis of mutual attribution.10

¶7

In this respect, the Chamber emphasized that “the leaders’
horizontal sharing of responsibility is critical because the
distinction between the Ngitis and the Lendus made it unlikely for
combatants to comply with the orders of a leader who was not of
the same ethnicity” (emphasis added).11 As such, the PTC rejected
the defense’s contention that it was improper to hold a coperpetrator criminally liable for the crimes committed by the fully
responsible subordinates of his co-perpetrator. Instead, coperpetration based on joint control over the crime was held to
involve “the division of essential tasks between two or more
persons, acting in a concerted manner, for the purposes of
committing that crime.” The fulfillment of such essential tasks can
be carried out by each co-perpetrator in person or through another
person.12
The PTC recalled that the objective elements for joint
commission are: (a) the existence of an agreement or common
plan, which must include the commission of a crime, between the
9

Drawing on principles of interpretation, the Chamber observed that the Statute
leaves open the possibility to lend the connective “or” in the formulation “jointly
with another or through another person” under article 25(3)(a) a reading that is
either inclusive (either one or the other, and possibly both) or exclusive (either
one or the other, but not both). As such, it found that “there are no legal grounds
for limiting the joint commission of the crime solely to cases in which the
perpetrators execute a portion of the crime by exercising direct control over it.”
Id. ¶¶ 491-92.
10
Id. ¶ 493.
11
Id. ¶ 519. Ituri district in the Orientale Province of the DRC includes at least
18 different ethnic groups, the largest being the Alur, the Bira, the Hema, and
the Lendu, as well as the Ngiti (a sub-group of the Lendu). Id. ¶¶ 1-4. During
2002, ongoing tensions in Ituri flared up into renewed acts of violence, bringing
armed conflict, inter alia, among the Hema, the Lendu, and the Ngiti. See id.
12
Id. ¶ 521.
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persons who physically carry out the elements of the crime or
between those who carry out the elements of the crime through
another individual, and (b) the coordinated essential contribution
made by each co-perpetrator resulting in the realization of the
objective elements of the crime. In relation to the latter, the
Chamber noted that only those to whom essential tasks have been
assigned—and who, consequently, have the power to frustrate the
commission of the crime by not performing their tasks—can be
said to have joint control over the crime.13
In establishing the elements that allow for the criminal
actions of subordinates to be attributed to their leaders, moreover,
the Chamber held that three factors must apply: (i) the leader must
control the organization that is used as an instrument of the crime;
(ii) the organization must be based on hierarchical relations
between superiors and subordinates, while composed of a
sufficient number of subordinates to guarantee that the superiors’
orders will be carried out, if not by one subordinate, then by
another;14 and (iii) authority within the organization must be such
that the leader’s orders will be complied with automatically, in an
almost mechanical manner, since the actual executioner of the
order is a replaceable “gear in a giant machine” or is otherwise so
brutalized by intensive, strict, and violent training regimens that
the leader can ensure automatic compliance with his orders.15
Comment

¶9

The approach of PTC I to the modes of liability displays an
effort to forge a distinct path for identifying the responsibility of
principals among a plurality of perpetrators. In particular, the
elaboration of a coherent exposition by the Chamber of the legal
and theoretical framework governing the applicability of modes of
participation in the first decisions of the ICC represents an
important milestone in the development of the Court’s early
13

Id. ¶¶ 522-25.
This may be evidenced by his capacity to hire, train, impose discipline, and
provide resources to his subordinates. Id. ¶¶ 513-14.
15
See id. ¶¶ 500-18. As the PTC notes, “The leader's ability to secure this
automatic compliance with his orders is the basis for his principal—rather than
accessorial—liability. The highest authority does not merely order the
commission of a crime, but through his control over the organisation, essentially
decides whether and how the crime would be committed.” Id. ¶ 518.
14
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jurisprudence. The regime negotiated in Rome for individual
criminal responsibility under Article 25(3) of the Statute is clearly
far more detailed than the basic parameters set out in the Statutes
of the ad hoc Tribunals. As the PTC has found, the mechanical
transfer of the jurisprudence developed by the ICTY and
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) on joint
criminal enterprise will therefore not be appropriate without a
careful consideration of the specific legal regime established by the
ICC Statute.16
¶10
At the same time it might be considered, similarly, that the
Court should not rely exclusively on theories of participation
derived from particular national legal systems without careful
consideration of the entire statutory framework.17 Thus, while the
control of the crime theory represents an important doctrinal guide
to the distinction between principal and secondary forms of
liability, particularly in the context of bureaucratically structured
hierarchical organizations, such as the Nazi organizational
apparatus during WWII, it may encounter limitations in addressing
all the forms of principal liability presented to the Court. To
remain adaptable to the different types of organized criminality
that will be litigated in the ICC, the formal requirements of control
of the crime theory as originally conceived may need to be applied
in ways that will enable it to evolve in one of two ways: (i) the
concept of the organizational apparatus through which control is
exercised may need to be conceived in more flexible terms than
those for which the theory was initially developed, or (ii) the
parameters of Article 25(3)(a) may need to be broadened so as to
capture other forms of principal liability not expressly regulated
therein. Both tendencies, however, could strain the utility of strict
adherence to the doctrine without significant adaptation to take
into account the Court’s sui generis legal regime and the context of
its application.
¶11
For example, if the starting point for the distinction between
principal and accessory forms of participation under the Statute is
the structure of Article 25(3), it is not clear why subparagraphs (b)(d) of Article 25(3) must of necessity be posited as secondary.
16

See id. ¶ 508.
There is little indication, for example, that the doctrinal concepts particular to
any national legal system served as the unique lens through which the drafters
negotiated and adopted Article 25.

17
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Why should a superior who orders the commission of a crime by
his subordinates not be held to be liable as a principal of the
crime?18 In the Katanga and Ngudjolo confirmation decision, the
PTC observed that ordering as a principal can be distinguished
from that as an accessory on the basis that:
An authority who issues an order within such an
organisation [in which the highest authorities can
ensure automatic compliance with their orders] …
assumes a different kind of responsibility than in
ordinary cases of criminal ordering. In the latter
cases, Article 25(3)(b) of the Statute provides that a
leader or commander who orders the commission of
a crime may be regarded as an accessory.19
Such a reading effectively creates two separate headings of
ordering under the Statute: one evident from the plain reading of
Article 25(3)(b) and one that can be subsumed into Article 25(3)(a)
as an underlying form of commission. This suggests also that other
forms of responsibility can only be relied upon to identify principal
liability to the extent that they could be subsumed into Article
25(3)(a). This would, however, create an uneven balance between
the provisions of Article 25(3), placing disproportionate reliance
on the opening subparagraph while effectively rendering redundant
(b)-(d) for the majority of the types of cases that will come before
the ICC.20
¶12
The positing by the Chamber of common purpose doctrine
under Article 25(3)(d) as a secondary form of liability, similarly,
renders the entire sub-provision inutile to address leadership
18

As the International Law Commission has noted, “[t]he superior who orders
the commission of the crime is in some respects more culpable than the
subordinate who merely carries out the order and thereby commits a crime that
he would not have committed on his own initiative. The superior contributes
significantly to the commission of the crime by using his position of authority to
compel the subordinate to commit a crime.” Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996).
19
Katanga & Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-717, ¶ 517.
20
This would result from the stated prosecutorial policy of focusing on persons
bearing the greatest responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.
See Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-OTP,
at 3 (2003).
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crimes. The Chamber’s reading appears to be based, in large part,
on an examination of the opening phrase of the paragraph “in any
other way contributes” to the commission of crimes, suggesting
that once the Statute has established that actual “commission” of
crimes strictu senso is captured by Article 25(3)(a), all other forms
must of necessity be read as secondary. Nonetheless, it appears
open to suggest that the phrase “[i]n any other way contributes to
the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a
group of persons acting with a common purpose” could relate to a
contribution to the commission of a crime strictu senso that is
other than that committed “as an individual, jointly with another or
through another person.”21
¶13
One answer to this seeming tension would be to posit a
unitary approach whereby the distinction between the liability of a
principal and that of an accessory does not automatically result in
the apportioning of a lower degree of blameworthiness for the
latter – that, rather, the two forms describe the nature of
participation in the conduct alleged and not necessarily the gravity
of applicable penalties.22 So long as the principal to a crime bears
more serious responsibility, prosecutorial charging policy will be
steered towards that form of characterization.
¶14
The more general response, however, is to acknowledge that
Article 25(3) of the Statute was drafted to provide the Court with a
range of modes of participation for its consideration without strict
adherence to doctrinal models particular to any national legal
system. While this may undercut the merits of developing at an
early stage a theoretically appealing self-contained system, it
appears inevitable that the Court, as its case-law develops, will
need to elaborate an approach to modes of liability that takes into
account the unique features of the Rome Statute, including the
general principles of criminal law and the applicable law
established therein.
21

Such a reading could, for example, borrow from the principles of
interpretation applied by the Chamber in the same decision to suggest that the
Statute does not necessarily limit the interpretation of “in any other way
contributes” to a reading that is either exclusive or inclusive, see supra note 9.
See generally Lubanga Decision on Confirmation of Charges, Case No. ICC01/04-01/06-803.
22
This, however, would appear to be effectively ruled out under the control of
the crime theory by PTC I; See Katanga & Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/0401/07-717, ¶ 499 (where the PTC correlates principal liability to assignment of
“the highest degree of responsibility for commission of a crime”).
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III. CONFIDENTIALITY & DISCLOSURE
¶15

Perhaps among the most publicized decisions of the ICC
during 2008 were those of Trial Chamber I in the case of The
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ordering a stay in the
proceedings and the release of the accused before the trial had
actually begun.23 At issue was the apparent tension between two
binding provisions of the Statute regulating the obligations of the
prosecution: one related to non-disclosure and the other to
disclosure, and the ability of the Chamber to resolve the matter.
Under one duty, pursuant to Article 54(3)(e), the prosecution must
ensure the non-disclosure of documents that it has agreed to obtain
under the conditions of confidentiality stipulated therein.24 The
provision is designed to enable cooperation from an information
provider that may be unwilling to make material available for
disclosure, but may agree to providing documents or information
to the prosecution on a confidential basis for the sole purpose of
generating new evidence and thereby not subject to disclosure
unless it grants its consent.25 Under a second statutory duty, Article
67(2) stipulates that the prosecution must disclose to the defense
potentially exculpatory evidence in its possession or control.26
23

Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, alleged former Commander-in-Chief of the Forces
Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC) and alleged president of the
Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC), is charged with criminal responsibility for
war crimes consisting of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 15
years into the FPLC and using them to participate actively in hostilities in the
context of an international armed conflict under article 8(2)(b)(xxvi); he is also
charged with enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 15 years into
the FPLC and using them to participate actively in hostilities in the context of an
armed conflict not of an international character under article 8(2)(e)(vii). See
Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Indictment (Aug. 29,
2006).
24
“The Prosecutor may: . . . (e) agree not to disclose, at any stage of the
proceedings, documents or information that the Prosecutor obtains on the
condition of confidentiality and solely for the purpose of generating new
evidence, unless the provider of the information consents.” Rome Statute, supra
note 2, at art. 54(3)(e).
25
See also Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rule 70, U.N. Doc. IT/32/REV. 42 (2008).
26
Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 67(2) (“In addition to any other disclosure
provided for in this Statute, the Prosecutor shall, as soon as practicable, disclose
to the defence evidence in the Prosecutor's possession or control which he or she
believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the
guilt of the accused, or which may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence.
In case of doubt as to the application of this paragraph, the Court shall decide.”).
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In its decision of June 13, 2008, the Trial Chamber ruled that
if the prosecution was unable to provide for disclosure of
exculpatory evidence in its possession or control due to a
significant body of such material being subject to non-disclosure
restrictions under Article 54(3)(e), nor allow the Chamber to
review such materials in order to assess the appropriateness of
counter-balancing measures proposed by the prosecution, the
proceedings must be indefinitely stayed. The Chamber held that a
stay was apposite due to the manner in which the prosecution had
entered into agreements with information providers on a routine
(as opposed to exceptional) basis and to apparently obtain evidence
that could potentially be used at trial, instead of using the material
solely to generate new evidence. At the same time, the agreements
appeared to preclude the Chamber from exercising its review
functions over the non-disclosure of confidential materials.27
Although the Trial Chamber held that it had not been divested of
jurisdiction, it went on to hold that the inevitable consequence of
its decision with respect to an indefinite stay of proceedings was an
order for the unconditional release of the accused.28
¶17
In the Lubanga case, the sources concerned were the United
Nations29 and several non-governmental organizations, both local
and international, working in eastern DRC in areas still volatile
and in conflict. These organizations had observed that the prospect
of unredacted disclosure without their consent, or even the fact of
their cooperation becoming known, posed risks to the personal
safety of their staff and of other individuals. The organizations
feared that disclosure could compromise their organizational
neutrality and security as well as the proper conduct of their
operations and activities on the ground, and might violate the
principle of originator consent with regards to documents obtained

27

Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1401 (Trial
Chamber I), Decision on the Consequences of Non-disclosure of Exculpatory
Materials Covered By Article 54(3)(e) Agreements and the Application to Stay
the Prosecution of the Accused, Together with Certain Other Issues Raised at
the Status Conference on 10 June 2008, ¶ 88 (June 13, 2008) [hereinafter
Lubanga Decision on Application to Stay Prosecution].
28
Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-1418 (Trial Chamber I),
Decision on the Release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ¶¶ 32-34 (July 2, 2008).
29
The information related in particular to the UN’s peacekeeping operation on
the ground dealing with security, demobilization, humanitarian and human
rights related activities, known by its French acronym MONUC.
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from third parties.30 In the absence of applicable guiding provisions
in the Statute, they asked, inter alia, that the Chambers provide
explicit guarantees that any ex parte review of their documents
would be conducted under conditions of confidentiality that would
ensure non-disclosure of the material absent their consent. The
Chamber could then determine, having access to the unredacted
versions of the said materials, the adequacy of the method of
disclosure proposed for each item by the relevant information
provider.31
¶18
Getting an undertaking of non-disclosure from both the Trial
and Appeals Chambers proved difficult. The Trial Chamber, in the
context of subsequent applications for the lifting of the stay,
recalled that it was indeed able to provide its undertaking not to
disclose the material without the consent of the information
providers. The Appeals Chamber, however, evidently could not
communicate such an undertaking by way of a ruling to that effect
as it was not seized of the matter.32 In the alternative, therefore, the
Trial Chamber was asked by the information providers to return
the materials after its review; with the items to be made available
afterwards, if required, to the Appeals Chamber on the same basis
and subject to the same conditions. However, this left the
possibility, as the Trial Chamber saw it, that the Appeals Chamber
might not get to conduct its review unless it agreed to the same
conditions.33 Instead, the Trial Chamber ruled that it would refuse
to begin its review unless the Appeals Chamber could also be
guaranteed to be able to review the said materials under the same
conditions; meaning that the orders on stay and release would
remain in effect.34

30

Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1434, (Appeals
Chamber), Prosecution’s Document in Support of Appeal Against Decision to
Stay Proceedings, ¶ 14 (July 14, 2008).
31
See Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-1467 (Trial Chamber I),
Redacted Version of “Decision on the Prosecution's Application to Lift the Stay
of Proceedings,” ¶¶ 5-17 (Sept. 3, 2008) [hereinafter Lubanga Decision on
Application to Lift Stay of Proceedings].
32
See Lubanga Decision on Application to Stay Prosecution, Case No. ICC01704-01/06-1401, ¶ 45, for the Trial Chamber’s earlier indication of its
willingness to give such an undertaking.
33
Lubanga Decision on Application to Lift Stay of Proceedings, Case No. ICC01/04-01/06-1467, ¶¶ 31-33.
34
Id. ¶¶ 29-40.
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In its judgments of October 21, 2008, rejecting the
prosecution’s first appeal, the Appeals Chamber clarified the entire
regime that should guide all such situations in the future:
In situations such as the present, where the material
in question was obtained on the condition of
confidentiality, the Trial Chamber (as well as any
other Chamber of this Court, including this Appeals
Chamber) will have to respect the confidentiality
agreement concluded by the Prosecutor under
Article 54(3)(e) of the Statute and cannot order the
disclosure of the material to the defence without the
prior consent of the information provider (see
Article 64(6)(c) of the Statute and Rule 81(3), first
sentence, of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence).
Instead, the Chamber will have to determine, in ex
parte proceedings open only to the Prosecutor,
whether the material would have had to be disclosed
to the defence, had it not been obtained under
Article 54(3)(e) of the Statute. If the Chamber
concludes that this is the case, the Prosecutor should
seek the consent of the information provider,
advising the provider of the ruling of the Chamber.
If the provider of the material does not consent to
the disclosure to the defence, the Chamber, while
prohibited from ordering the disclosure of the
material to the defence, will then have to determine
whether and, if so, which counter-balancing
measures can be taken to ensure that the rights of
the accused are protected and that the trial is fair, in
spite of the non-disclosure of the information.35

35

Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 13 (Appeals
Chamber), Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of
Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the Consequences of Non-disclosure of
Exculpatory Materials Covered by Article 54(3)(e) Agreements and the
Application to Stay the Prosecution of the Accused, Together with Certain Other
Issues Raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008,” ¶ 48 (October 21,
2008) [hereinafter Lubanga Judgment on Appeal Against Decision on
Application to Stay Prosecution].
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The Appeals Chamber, however, reversed the Trial
Chamber’s ruling on release. In particular, it held that a
“conditional” stay of the proceedings may be the appropriate
remedy where a fair trial cannot be held at the time that the stay is
imposed.36 Such a trial, nonetheless, might become possible at a
later stage due to the resolution of the issue; assuming this would
not violate the accused’ rights for other reasons such as the right to
be tried without undue delay. Therefore, the unconditional release
of the accused person was not the “inevitable” consequence and
“the only correct course” to take in such circumstances, as had
been held by the Trial Chamber. Instead, the Chamber would have
to consider all relevant circumstances, including foreseeable
prospects for a resolution to the matter, and base its decision on
release or detention on the governing criteria set out in Articles 60
and 58(1) of the Statute.37
Comment

¶21

The two judgments of the Appeals Chamber have several
important ramifications for the future work of the Court. In the first
place, the Appeals Chamber made it clear that potential tensions
between the requirements of confidentiality and those of a fair trial
should be avoided preemptively by the Office of the Prosecutor. In
particular, Article 54(3)(e) should be applied in strict adherence to
the conditions stipulated in the provision so as to avoid routine
resort to its application. Also, confidentiality agreements should be
concluded in a manner that will allow the Court to resolve any
potential tensions that may arise. However, where tension does
arise, it affirmed that disclosure obligations under Article 67(2) do
not override the confidentiality of information under Article
54(3)(e). If disclosure cannot be effected, the Chambers must
provide for an appropriate remedy to ensure that fairness results.38
36

Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 12 (Appeals
Chamber), Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of
Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the Release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,”
(Oct. 21, 2008).
37
Id. ¶¶ 37-42.
38
Lubanga Judgment on Appeal Against Decision on Application to Stay
Prosecution, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 13, ¶ 48. The Appeals Chamber, as
the Trial Chamber before it, appears to have treated in equal terms disclosure
obligations with respect to potentially exculpatory materials pursuant to article
67(2) and materials subject to inspection under Rule 77.
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The Appeals Chamber indicated that determination of appropriate
remedies or “counter-balancing measures” may include such
measures as the identification of similar exculpatory material, the
provision of materials in summarized form, the stipulation of
relevant facts, or the amendment or withdrawal of charges.39 This
means that the defense does not enjoy an absolute right to the
disclosure of every item of potentially exculpatory material under
Article 67(2) or the inspection of material under Rule 77 in its
entirety – it may be restricted on the basis of Article 54(3)(e).
Nevertheless, this can only be decided by way of judicial control.40
This means that, pursuant to the last sentence of Article 67(2),
where required, the Court must be able to review potentially
exculpatory documents in the prosecution’s possession or control
that were obtained pursuant to Article 54(3)(e) in order to
determine the extent of the prosecution’s disclosure obligations.
¶22
At the same time, the judgment provides procedural certainty
by confirming that no chambers of the Court can order the
disclosure of 54(3)(e) materials to the defense without the prior
consent of the information provider. This is because a chamber
will itself be required to respect the conditions of confidentiality
provided for by the Article 54(3)(e) agreement, pursuant to its
statutory obligation to provide for the confidentiality of
information.41 This particular aspect of the ruling may, nonetheless,
have implications for future cooperation from some providers who
might prove reticent to share information that could potentially go
beyond the strict control of the Prosecutor.
¶23
Upon obtaining the information providers’ consent, the
prosecution was able, having met all the Chamber’s preconditions,
to file all of the materials in question in fully unredacted form,
before the Trial Chamber for its review in ex parte hearings open
only to the prosecution.42 This allowed the Chamber to assess the
39

Id. ¶¶ 28, 44. While these measures had been proposed by the Prosecution
during earlier proceedings before the Trial Chamber, the bench had ruled that it
would be unable to assess the adequacy of such measures absent review of the
underlying materials in unredacted form.
40
Id. ¶ 47.
41
Id. ¶ 48.
42
Ultimately, the prosecution was able to obtain this consent prior to the
issuance of the Appeals Chamber's decision; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1478 (Trial Chamber), Prosecution's
Application for Trial Chamber to Review all the Undisclosed Evidence Obtained
from Information Providers (Oct. 14, 2009). This consent was obtained by
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adequacy of the proposed method of disclosure for each document,
whether by way of redactions, use of summaries, admissions of
fact, or any combination thereof. On November 18, 2008, the Trial
Chamber declared that it had completed its review of the materials
to its satisfaction, ordered the prosecution to proceed in accordance
with the approved method of disclosure for each document, and
lifted the stay of proceedings.43
IV. GRAVITY
¶24

Another important decision made public in 2008 was an
Appeals Chamber judgment that had been rendered in 2006, but
kept under seal pending modification in its classification.44 The
decision concerned the case against Bosco Ntaganda, an alleged
co-perpetrator with Thomas Lubanga, against whom a warrant had
been simultaneously sought by the Prosecutor in the same warrant
application.45 The Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) had initially declined
combining the assurance already provided by the Trial Chamber on its
confidential treatment of the documents during the proposed review with an
undertaking by the prosecution towards the providers that it would seek to take
all protective measures, including if necessary withdrawal of the charges, in the
event the Appeals Chamber were to issue an order the disclosure of documents
without the providers' consent; see id., ICC-01/04-01/06-1478-Anx1.
43
Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, Stay of Proceedings in the Lubanga Case
is Lifted - Trial Provisionally Scheduled for 26 January 2009, ICC-CPI20081118-PR372 (Nov. 18, 2008); Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC01/04-01/06-1644 (Trial Chamber I), Reasons for Oral Decision Lifting the Stay
of Proceedings (Jan. 23, 2009).
44
Situation in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Judgment on the Prosecutor's
Appeal Against the Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber Entitled “Decision on the
Prosecutor's Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58”, Case No. ICC01/04-169 (Appeals Chamber) (issued under seal July 13, 2006, reclassified as
public on Sept. 23, 2008); Situation in Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Decision on the Unsealing of the Judgment of the Appeals Chamber Issued on
July 13, 2006, Case No. ICC-01/04-538 (Appeals Chamber) (Sept. 22, 2008).
The proceedings had initially been conducted under seal in the interests of
facilitating apprehension, but were later modified at the Prosecution’s request.
45
Bosco Ntaganda, alleged Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Forces
Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC), is alleged to be criminally
responsible for the war crime of enlisting and conscripting of children under the
age of 15 years into the FPLC and using them to participate actively in
hostilities in the context of an international armed conflict under article
8(2)(b)(xxvi); or, in the alternative, enlisting and conscripting children under the
age of 15 years into the FPLC and using them to participate actively in
hostilities in the context of an armed conflict not of an international character
under article 8(2)(e)(vii).
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to issue a warrant of arrest based on its reading of the gravity
criteria under the Court’s admissibility provisions in Article
17(1)(d), which stipulates the Court shall determine that a case is
inadmissible where “[t]he case is not of sufficient gravity to justify
further action by the Court.”46 The PTC had held that for a case to
be admissible the conduct must be either systematic or large-scale,
with due regard paid to the social alarm caused to the international
community and that the person charged must be among the most
senior leaders accused of the most serious crimes.47 The PTC
opined that persons at the top of their organizations who play a
major role in the systematic or large-scale commission of crimes
are “the ones who can most effectively prevent or stop the
commission of those crimes.” As the Chamber explained:
… only by concentrating on this type of individual
can the deterrent effects of the activities of the
Court be maximised because other senior leaders in
similar circumstances will know that solely by
doing what they can to prevent the systematic or
large-scale commission of crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court can they be sure that they
will not be prosecuted by the Court.48
¶25

Applying this test to the Prosecutor’s application for an
arrest warrant against Bosco Ntaganda led the Chamber to declare
the case inadmissible based on the seniority and overall role
Ntaganda played within the UPC/FPLC armed group.
¶26
The Appeals Chamber held that the test developed by the
PTC was flawed. In relation to the requirement that the conduct
must be either systematic or large scale, the Appeals Chamber
46

Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 (Pre-Trial Chamber
I), Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrant of Arrest, Article 58, ¶¶
77-89 (Feb. 10, 2006) [hereinafter Lubanga Arrest Warrant Decision].
47
The three-pronged test set out by the Chamber specifically required that: (i)
the alleged conduct was either systematic or large-scale, the due regard paid to
the social alarm caused to the international community; (ii) the person fell
within the category of most senior leaders of the situation under investigation;
and (iii) the person fell within the category of most senior leaders suspected of
being most responsible, considering their own role and the role played by group
or entity to which they belong in the overall commission of crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court in the relevant situation; Id. ¶ 64.
48
Id. ¶¶ 54-55.
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declared that the PTC effectively blurred the distinction between
the jurisdictional requirements for war crimes and crimes against
humanity, contrary to the express terms of the Statute.49 The
Chamber also agreed with the prosecution that the criterion of
“social alarm” was dependent on “subjective and contingent
reactions to crimes rather than upon their objective gravity” and
was therefore inappropriate for the determination of
admissibility.50 The rigid requirement that the person belong to the
group of most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible,
moreover, was held to be incompatible with the retributive and
preventative impact of the ICC because it excluded entire
categories of perpetrators from potentially being brought before the
Court. In particular, the Appeals Chamber noted that the role of a
person or an organization may vary considerably and thus “should
not be exclusively assessed or predetermined on excessively
formulistic grounds.”51 In terms of the overall approach to
interpreting gravity in the light of the drafting history of Article
17(1)(d), moreover, the Appeals Chamber observed that States
explicitly rejected proposals to limit admissibility strictly to cases
of “exceptional gravity,” thereby emphasizing that gravity should
not be narrowly construed.52
¶27
On a separate, but related issue in the same judgment, the
Appeals Chamber also rejected the PTC’s contention that an initial
determination of the admissibility of a case is a prerequisite to the
issuance of an arrest warrant. In particular, the Appeals Chamber
observed that Article 58(1) lists exhaustively the substantive
prerequisites for the issuance of an arrest warrant, namely: (i) that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person committed a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, and (ii) the arrest of the
person appears necessary.53 Prior determination of admissibility at
the arrest warrant application stage where the person sought is
unable to participate in the proceedings could also severely impair
49

Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04-186,
Judgment on the Prosecutor's Appeal Against the Decision of the Pre-Trial
Chamber Entitled “Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Warrants of
Arrest, Article 58,” ¶ 70 (July 13, 2006) [hereinafter Situation in the DRC,
Judgment on Appeal Against Arrest Warrant Decision].
50
Id. ¶ 72.
51
Id. ¶ 76.
52
Id. ¶ 81.
53
Id. ¶¶ 42-44.
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the rights of a suspect by predetermining a finding of admissibility
that he or she might later seek to challenge before the same
Chamber.54 Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber held that when the
Prosecution Application is made on a confidential and ex parte
basis, the PTC should only exercise its discretion under Article
19(1) of the Statute in exceptional circumstances, bearing in mind
the interests of the suspect. Such circumstances were identified as
including instances where “uncontested facts” or “self-evident
factors” render a case clearly inadmissible or an “ostensible cause”
impels the exercise of review.55
Comment
¶28

The Appeals Chamber’s overruling of the Pre-Trial
Chamber’s social alarm and most–senior-leaders test represents
one of the most significant rulings of the Court to date, given its
impact on all future admissibility assessments. It impacts not only
the scope of cases that will potentially be admissible before the
Court, but the nature of the focus adopted by the Prosecutor in the
formulation of his investigative strategies.56 This is particularly
relevant for in the type of complex and malleable group structures
to which an ICC case may attach. The Appeals Chamber’s ruling
that gravity should not be “exclusively assessed or predetermined
on excessively formulistic grounds,”57 for example, will probably
help avoid litigation over the fulfillment of rigid organizational
criteria. More generally, the judgment appears to distinguish
between discretionary policy considerations, such as the adoption
of a prosecutorial policy to focus as a general rule on persons
bearing the greatest responsibility, and the setting of mandatory
legal thresholds for admissibility. While the absence of a definition
of gravity in the majority decision means that much is left
undecided and remains subject to future litigation,58 the judgment
54

Id. ¶ 50.
Id. ¶¶ 52-53.
56
E.g., The third application for arrest warrants in the Darfur Situation relies on
the Appeals Chamber’s finding on gravity to support the prima facie
admissibility of the case. See also infra note 76 and accompanying text.
57
Situation in the DRC, Judgment on Appeal Against Arrest Warrant Decision,
Case No. ICC-01/04-186, ¶ 76.
58
Judge Pikis, in his separate and partly dissenting opinion, offered the followed
guidance: “[W]hich cases are unworthy of consideration by the International
55
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notably dismissed the setting of an overly restrictive threshold that
would hamper the preventative or deterrent role of the Court.
¶29
The finding that a determination on the admissibility of a
case is not a prerequisite for the issuance of an arrest warrant and,
moreover, the parameters set by the Appeals Chamber on the
exercise of the Court’s discretionary powers under Article 19(1) of
the Statute, will also have important implications for the nature and
scope of the assessment undertaken by chambers at the warrant
application stage.59
V. VICTIMS’ PARTICIPATION
¶30

The Appeals Chamber also rendered a number of decisions
during the year that provide further clarity on the scope of victims’
participation before the ICC. In particular, in its judgment of July
11, 2008, the Appeals Chamber examined how the concept of
“harm” should be defined for the purpose of Rule 85(a). The
provision reads: “‘[v]ictims’ means natural persons who have
suffered harm as a result of the commission of any crime within
the jurisdiction of the Court.” The Chamber observed that for the
purpose of the definition of who is a victim, the harm suffered,
whether material, physical or psychological, must necessarily have
been suffered personally by the victim.60 Such harm, however,
Criminal Court? The answer is cases insignificant in themselves; where the
criminality on the part of the culprit is wholly marginal; borderline cases. A
crime is insignificant in itself if, notwithstanding the fact that it satisfies the
formalities of the law, i.e., the insignia of the crime, bound up with the mens rea
and actus reus, the acts constituting the crime are wholly peripheral to the
objects or the law in criminalising the conduct. Both the inception and the
consequences of the crime must be negligible. In those circumstances, the Court
need not concern itself with the crime nor will it assume jurisdiction for the trial
of such an offence, when national courts fail to do so. Any other construction of
article 17(1)(d) would neutralize its avowed objects and purposes and to a large
extent empty it of content. The subject matter must be minimal, so much so that
it can be ignored by the Court.” Situation in the DRC, Judgment on Appeal
Against Arrest Warrant Decision, Case No. ICC-01/04-186, Separate and Partly
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis, ¶ 40.
59
See, e.g., Situation in the DRC, Judgment on Appeal Against Arrest Warrant
Decision, Case No. ICC-01/04-186, ¶ 45 (finding that undertaking an
admissibility at the article 58 stage “may substantially prolong the proceedings
in respect of the application for a warrant of arrest”).
60
Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA9 OA10
(Appeals Chamber), Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence
Against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January
2008, ¶ 38 (July 11, 2008) [hereinafter Lubanga Judgment on Appeals Against
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could be both direct and indirect. As the Chamber observed, the
harm suffered by one victim can give rise to harm suffered by
others, such as the recruitment of a child soldier which may result
in personal suffering of both the child concerned and the parents of
that child. So long as the harm suffered is personal to the
individual, it can attach to both direct and indirect victims of a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.61
¶31
In the context of a particular case, the next issue was for
which crime exactly must the victim have suffered personal harm.
The Trial Chamber had held that Rule 85 does not restrict the
participation of victims to only those who were victims of the
particular crimes contained in the charges. Accordingly, a victim
of any crime falling within the jurisdiction of the Court could
potentially participate in the Lubanga trial.62 The Appeals Chamber
reversed this finding. It held that for the purposes of participation
in the trial proceedings, the harm alleged by a victim and the
concept of personal interests under Article 68 (3) of the Statute
must be linked with the charges confirmed against the accused. As
the judgment noted:
Given that the purpose of trial proceedings is the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused person of the crimes charged, and that the
application under Rule 89 (1) of the Rules in this
context is for participation in the trial, only victims
of these crimes will be able to demonstrate that the
trial, as such, affects their personal interests.
Therefore, only victims who are victims of the
crimes charged may participate in the trial
proceedings pursuant to Article 68 (3) of the Statute
read with Rule 85 and 89 (1) of the Rules. Once the
Decision on Victims’ Participation].
61
Id. ¶ 32.
62
In order to give effect to such participation in a manner that was meaningful
and serve the interests of justice, the Trial Chamber held that the victim must
nonetheless establish whether (i) there is a “real evidential link between the
victim and the evidence which the Court will be considering during Mr. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo’s trial . . . leading to the conclusion that the victim’s personal
interests are affected” or (ii) the victim was “affected by an issue arising during
Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’s trial because his or her personal interests are in a
real sense engaged by it[.]” Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/0401/06 (Trial Chamber), Decision on Victims’ Participation, ¶ 95 (Jan. 18, 2008).
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charges in a case against an accused have been
confirmed in accordance with Article 61 of the
Statute, the subject matter of the proceedings in that
case is defined by the crimes charged.63
The Appeals Chamber agreed, moreover, with the contention that
it would exceed the Trial Chamber’s competency to consider
crimes that fell outside of the parameters set forth in the charges.64
¶32
Finally, in relation to the third ground of the appeal, raised
by both the prosecution and the defense, the judgment confirmed
the Trial Chamber’s finding that victims participating at trial may
in limited circumstances present evidence pertaining to the guilt or
innocence of the accused and may challenge the admissibility or
relevance of evidence. The Appeals Chamber held that while the
right to lead evidence pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the
accused and the right to challenge the admissibility or relevance of
evidence in trial proceedings lies primarily with the parties, there is
nothing precluding a role for victims.65
¶33
In particular, the judgment concurred with the Trial
Chamber’s consideration of Article 69(3) of the Statute which
provides “the Court has the authority to request the submission of
all evidence that it considers necessary for the determination of the
truth.”66 Read together with Article 68(3) and Rule 91(3) of the
Rules concerning the victims’ participation in the proceedings, the
Appeals Chamber agreed that the legislative framework left open
the possibility for victims “to move the Chamber to request the
submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for the
determination of the truth.”67 As had been observed by the Trial
Chamber, such a possibility did not create an unfettered right for
victims to lead or challenge evidence, but instead “victims are
required to demonstrate why their interests are affected by the
evidence or issue, upon which the Chamber will decide, on a caseby-case basis whether or not to allow such participation.”68
Similarly, in relation to the right to challenge the admissibility or
63

Lubanga Judgment on Appeals Against Decision on Victims’ Participation,
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ¶ 62.
64
Id. ¶ 63.
65
Id. ¶¶ 93-94.
66
Id. ¶ 95.
67
Id. ¶ 98.
68
Id. ¶ 99.
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relevance of evidence, the Appeals Chamber affirmed the lower
chamber’s finding that nothing excludes a Trial Chamber ruling on
the admissibility or relevance of evidence after having received
submissions by the victims.69 The system is thus predicated upon a
discrete application by victims to the bench requesting it to invoke
the Chamber’s own powers: victims do not have the ability to lead
or challenge evidence as of right.
¶34
As elaborated by the Appeals Chamber, the limits within
which a Trial Chamber should exercise its powers to permit
victims to tender and examine evidence require: (i) a discrete
application, (ii) notice to the parties, (iii) demonstration of personal
interests that are affected by the specific proceedings, (iv)
compliance with disclosure obligations and protection orders, (v)
determination of appropriateness and (vi) consistency with the
rights of the accused and a fair trial.70
¶35
The majority decision on this last ground of appeal elicited
strong dissents from Judges Pikis and Kirsch, who held that the
Statute does not permit the participation of anyone in the proof or
disproof of the charges other than the Prosecutor and the accused.71
The participation of victims in the proceedings, by contrast, was
strictly confined to the expression of their “views and concerns,”
as provided for under Article 68(3); they could not effectively be

69

Id. ¶ 101.
Id. ¶ 104. As to the requirements for timely disclosure, the judgment held
“[i]n deciding each application the Trial Chamber, being vigilant in
safeguarding the rights of the accused could take into account, inter alia,
whether the hearing of such evidence would be appropriate, timely or for other
reasons should not be ordered. If the Trial Chamber decides that the evidence
should be presented then it could rule on the modalities for the proper disclosure
of such evidence before allowing it to be adduced and depending on the
circumstances it could order one of the parties to present the evidence, call the
evidence itself, or order the victims to present the evidence.” Id. ¶ 100.
71
As Judge Pikis observed, “The proof or disproof of the charges is a matter
affecting the adversaries. The victims have no say in the matter. Their interest is
that justice should be done, coinciding with the interest of the world at large that
the criminal process should run its course according to law, according to the
norms of a fair trial. Both the submission of evidence and its reception affect the
parties to the adversity. It is not the victims’ concern, a matter directly related to
the reception of evidence, to either prove or disprove the charges.” Lubanga
Judgment on Appeals Against Decision on Victims’ Participation, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/06, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pikis, ¶ 19. Judge Pikis
also partly dissented on the question of whether the personal harm suffered by
victims can be anything other than direct harm. Id. ¶ 3.
70
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made parties to the proceedings.72 As set out in their separate partly
dissenting opinions, such a reading was confirmed by the
legislative choice made by the drafters of the Statute who placed
no disclosure requirements on victims, since it was not envisaged
that victims would either disclose or lead evidence relating to guilt
or innocence.73 Judge Kirsch noted, in particular, that the
provisions dealing with evidence relating to guilt or innocence
refer to submissions by the “parties,” while the Chambers’ own
powers relate to requesting those same parties to submit all
evidence that is necessary for the establishment of the truth.74 As to
challenges to the admissibility or relevance of evidence, Judge
Kirsch opined that the Trial Chamber’s power to rule on the
admissibility or relevance of evidence under Article 64(9) could
only be invoked by the parties, as explicitly provided for in the
provision, and not by the participants.75
¶36
In a separate decision of December 19, 2008, on the scope of
victims’ participation, the Appeals Chamber reversed an earlier
decision of the PTC on whether victims can be offered general
participatory rights in the investigation of crimes committed in a
situation referred to the Court.76 In noting that Article 68(3)
provides for the participation of victims at any stages of the
proceedings, the Appeals Chamber held that such participation can
take place only within the context of judicial proceedings. The
Appeals Chamber defined “proceeding” as “a term denoting a
72

As Judge Kirsch observed, “On an ordinary understanding of those words,
they do not equate to an ability to lead evidence on guilt. It would, in my view,
be perfectly legitimate for victims to present their views and concerns in relation
to the evidence submitted by the parties where it affects their personal interests.
However, there is a sizeable difference between presenting views and concerns
in relation to issues that arise at the trial that affect the personal interests of
victims and presenting a prosecution case by leading additional evidence independent of that led by the Prosecutor - on guilt.” Lubanga Judgment on
Appeals Against Decision on Victims’ Participation, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06,
Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Philippe, ¶ 30.
73
See id. ¶¶ 15-23.
74
Judge Kirsch contrasted this with the provisions on reparations, where the
Rules explicitly foresee the leading of evidence by victims. Id. ¶ 22.
75
Id. ¶ 35.
76
Situation in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04-556
(Appeals Chamber), Judgment on Victim Participation in the Investigation Stage
of the Proceedings in the Appeal of the OPCD against the Decision of Pre-Trial
Chamber I of 7 December 2007 and in the Appeals of the OPCD and the
Prosecutor Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 24 December 2007
(Dec. 19, 2008).
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judicial cause pending before a Chamber. In contrast, an
investigation is not a judicial proceeding but an inquiry conducted
by the Prosecutor into the commission of a crime with a view to
bringing to justice those deemed responsible.”77 As the Appeals
Chamber went on to observe: “Manifestly, authority for the
conduct of investigations vests in the Prosecutor. Acknowledgment
by the Pre-Trial Chamber of a right to victims to participate in the
investigation would necessarily contravene the Statute by reading
into it a power outside its ambit and remit.”78
¶37
The Appeals Chamber also recalled that while participation
pursuant to Article 68(3) of the Statute aims to afford victims an
opportunity to voice their views and concerns on matters affecting
their personal interests, such a role “does not equate them … to
parties to the proceedings before a Chamber.” Their participation is
restricted “to issues arising therein touching upon their personal
interests, and then at stages and in a manner not inconsistent with
the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.”79
Comment
¶38

The above judgments of the Appeals Chamber will have a
significant impact in shaping the contours of victim’s participation
in future trial proceedings. Of particular importance is the
clarification that participation in trial proceedings must be linked
to the charges confirmed against the accused. This will prevent the
Court from being flooded with applications concerning matters that
are extraneous to the case pending before it.
¶39
As to the role of victims in presenting and challenging
evidence, the system foreseen by the majority envisages a tightly
regulated scheme to avoid inconsistencies with the rights of the
defense and the role of the prosecution. It can only be triggered by
leave of the chamber, which must be convinced that a narrowly
prescribed threshold has been satisfied to warrant the exercise of
its own discretionary powers. The chamber will also need to
closely regulate disclosure obligations, including the adequacy of
prior notice, any delay in the timing thereof, and the application of
77

Id. ¶ 45. Victims are nonetheless not precluded from seeking participation in
any judicial proceedings affecting investigations. Id. ¶ 56.
78
Id. ¶¶ 45, 52.
79
Id. ¶ 55.
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such obligations to both incriminatory and exonerating materials.
If so controlled, the system might well operate in a manner that
does not impinge on the requirements of a fair and expeditious
trial, limiting acceptance by a chamber of such motions to highly
specific circumstances. Nonetheless, the Court will no doubt need
to remain mindful of the observations of Judges Pikis and Kirsch
that, in accordance with the scheme of the Statute, the accused
should be faced by one prosecutor, who bears the onus of proving
guilt at the trial, rather than, potentially, multiple accusers: “The
different roles played by the Prosecutor and the victims must be
kept distinct if the proceedings are to run in an orderly fashion
which best protects the interests of all parties and participants
involved.”80
¶40
Finally, the clarification by the Appeals Chamber as to the
role of victims at the situation stage, i.e. during investigations,
removes any lingering doubt as to the nature of the prosecution’s
discretion at this stage and its independence from any mandatory
duty to pursue complaints lodged with it by victims or others.81
VI. WITNESS PROOFING
¶41

The issue of witness proofing first arose during a status
conference in the Lubanga case prior to the confirmation hearing,
where the prosecution informed the PTC of its intention to conduct
“proofing sessions” with particular witnesses.82 After instructing
that such activity not be undertaken until hearing submissions from
the parties and participants on the subject, the PTC issued a
decision on November 8, 2006, in which it distinguished between
“witness familiarisation” and “witness proofing.” The PTC
characterized “witness familiarisation” essentially as “a series of
arrangements to familiarise the witnesses with the layout of the
Court, the sequence of events that is likely to take place when the
witness is giving testimony, and the different responsibilities of the

80

Id. ¶ 25.
As the Chamber observed, the scope for victims within the statutory scheme
during investigations as with anyone else with relevant information is to pass it
on to the Prosecutor, or to otherwise make representations to the Prosecutor on
any matter pertaining to the investigations and to their interests. Id. ¶ 53.
82
Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 (Pre-Trial Chamber
I), Transcript of Hearing on October 26, 2006, ¶ 11: 1-6 (Oct. 26, 2006).
81
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various participants at the hearing,”83 for which it found legal
authority under the Statute, and to be entrusted to the Registry’s
Victims and Witnesses Unit. The PTC characterized the practice of
“witness proofing” as the substantive preparation of a witness prior
to testimony by the calling party which, by contrast, it deemed
prohibited.84
¶42
As the PTC ruled, there were such wide discrepancies in
approaches by national jurisdictions with regard to the practice of
witness proofing that it was unable, pursuant to Article 21(1)(c) of
the Statute, to discern authority from general principles of law
from national laws of legal systems of the world.85 It also noted the
paucity of jurisprudence from the ICTY and ICTR to enable
identification of relevant principles and rules of international law
pursuant to Article 21(1)(b).86 As summarized by the PTC, risks
associated with witness proofing that support treatment of the
practice as unethical or unlawful include: (i) a witness altering the
emphasis of their evidence; (ii) a witness deliberately or
inadvertently confusing information given during the proofing
83

Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Practices of Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing, ¶ 15 (Nov. 8, 2006)
[hereinafter Lubanga Decision on Witness Familiarization and Proofing].
84
Id.
85
Id. ¶¶ 36-42. Article 21 of the ICC Statute provides:

86

1. The Court shall apply:
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of
Procedure and Evidence;
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the
principles and rules of international law, including the established
principles of the international law of armed conflict;
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from
national laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate,
the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction
over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with
this Statute and with international law and internationally recognized
norms and standards.
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous
decisions.
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be
consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any
adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7,
paragraph 3, age, race, color, language, religion or belief, political or other
opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 21.

Lubanga Decision on Witness Familiarization and Proofing, Case No. ICC01/04-01/06, ¶¶ 28-42 (2006).
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sessions; (iii) a witness unconsciously trying to fill in their
testimony with logical inferences from the proofing sessions; (iv)
witness proofing inappropriately enhancing the credibility of
witnesses because the more the witnesses practice, the more
confident and detailed their recollection becomes; and (v) witness
proofing, particularly through providing advance notice of the
questions that would be asked, depriving court-room testimony of
its spontaneity.87 Among reasons put forward to justify witness
proofing as good professional practice included the fact that
witness proofing: (i) enables the identification of differences and
deficiencies in recollection prior to the testimony of witnesses in
the courtroom; (ii) enables the differences and deficiencies in
recollection identified in the proofing sessions to be addressed
prior to the testimony of the witnesses in the courtroom; and (iii) is
likely to allow witnesses to present their evidence in a more
accurate, structured and exhaustive manner.88
¶43
The issue was revisited before the Trial Chamber which
heard further submissions from the parties and participants. The
prosecution maintained the propriety of witness proofing as
confirmed by the established practice and jurisprudence of the ad
hoc Tribunals.89 It noted that the fact that the ICC Statute and
Rules do not refer to the term “witness proofing” does not preclude
the Chamber from approving these practices; observing that the
practice could advance the goal of establishing the truth and be
utilized by both parties.90 In support, the prosecution argued that
87

Id. ¶ 37 n.41.
Id. ¶ 37 n.42.
89
Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T (Trial Chamber III),
Decision on Defence Motions to Prohibit Witness Proofing, ¶ 10 (Dec. 15,
2006) [hereinafter Karemera Decision on Witness Proofing]; Prosecutor v.
Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T (Trial Chamber), Decision on Ojdanić Motion
to Prohibit Witness Proofing, ¶ 10 (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Milutmovic
Decision on Witness Proofing]; Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No IT-03-66-T (Trial
Chamber II), Decision on the Defence Motion on Prosecution Practice of
Proofing Witnesses, ¶ 3 (Dec. 10, 2004).
90
The prosecution argued that such witness proofing could encompass: (i)
providing the witness with their statement a few days prior to the proofing
session to allow the witness to refresh their memory; (ii) meeting with the
witness a few days before they are to give evidence to remind the witness of
their role and their duty to tell the truth; (iii) discussing issues that could lead to
a request for protective measures for the witness; and (iv) addressing any areas
within the witness statement that may be addressed in court. Witnesses could
also be shown potential exhibits and asked to comment on them, and further
enquiry be made about potentially incriminatory and exculpatory information,
88
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witness proofing allows for a relevant, accurate, complete, orderly
and efficient presentation of evidence, and enables the defense or
other party to have notice of any different recollection of the
witness, thereby preventing undue surprise.91
¶44
The defense suggested that once a witness had completed his
or her statement, the prosecution should not be able to go over the
substance of this testimony with the witness. While it accepted that
the prosecution should be permitted to see the witness and remind
him or her of certain critical points, the defense proposed that the
Chamber should set a cut-off date after which the prosecution
could no longer raise the substance of the testimony of the witness,
suggesting that such activities should be prohibited from the
moment one party notifies the other of its intention to call the
witness to testify, e.g., by placing the name of the witness on the
witness list.92
¶45
The Trial Chamber essentially upheld the ruling of the PTC
in prohibiting the practice of witness proofing, while slightly
expanding the range of activities that may be undertaken as part of
witness familiarization.93 It also affirmed the PTC’s observation
that witnesses are not attributable to parties but rather are witnesses
of the Court.94 As set out by the Trial Chamber, the process to be
undertaken by the Registry’s Victims and Witnesses Unit in
consultation with the party introducing the witness included:
a. Assisting the witness to understand fully the
Court's proceedings, its participants and
their respective roles;
b. Reassuring witnesses about their role in
proceedings before the Court;

which would be shared with the defense. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/06-1049, Decision Regarding the Practices Used to Prepare and
Familiarise Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial, ¶ 12 (Nov. 30, 2007)
[hereinafter Lubanga Decision on Witness Preparation for Testimony at Trial].
91
Id. ¶ 13.
92
Id. ¶ 20.
93
See Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1351, Decision
Regarding the Protocol on the Practices to be used to Prepare Witnesses for
Trial (May 23, 2008) [hereinafter Lubanga Decision on Protocol to Prepare
Witnesses for Trial].
94
Lubanga Decision on Witness Preparation for Testimony at Trial, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/06-1049, ¶ 34 (2007).
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c. Ensuring that witnesses clearly understand
that they are under a strict legal obligation to
tell the truth when testifying;
d. Explaining to the witnesses the process of
examination;
e. Discussing matters relating to the security
and safety of witnesses in order to determine
the necessity of applications for protective
measures;
f. Providing witnesses with an opportunity to
acquaint themselves with the people who
may examine them in court;
g. “Walking witnesses through” the courtroom
and its procedure prior to the day of their
testimony in order to acquaint them with the
layout of the court, and particularly where
the various participants will be seated and
the technology that will be used in order to
minimise any confusion or intimidation.95
The Victims and Witness Unit was also tasked with making
available to the witness a copy of any witness statement they may
have made in order to refresh their memory, which was to be
provided to the Victims and Witness Unit by the calling party. The
Chamber explained that the purpose of allowing a witness to reread
his or her statements to refresh their memory could not be equated
with an “evidence-checking” procedure that aims at testing or
correcting a witness’ original account; and that any such
discrepancies should be ventilated in court rather than being
discussed and recorded shortly before the witness gives evidence.96
The Chamber affirmed that once the process of witness
familiarization has been commenced, any further meeting between
a party and its witness outside of Court is prohibited.97
95

Id. ¶ 53.
Lubanga Decision on Protocol to Prepare Witnesses for Trial, Case No. ICC01/04-01/06-1351, ¶¶ 38-40 (2008). The Chamber went on to hold without
elaboration that “unless something exceptional occurs, the VWU is not under an
obligation to provide a report on the statement-reading process to the parties and
the Chamber.”
97
Lubanga Decision on Witness Preparation for Testimony at Trial, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/06-1049, ¶ 56 (2007).
96
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Comment
¶46

The issue of witness proofing has become notable for the
divergent practice that has emerged at the international level and
the extraordinary dialogue it has engendered between the different
international courts and tribunals. Following the PTC’s initial
decision in 2006 prohibiting the practice before the ICC the ruling
was immediately relied upon as authority by defense counsel
before both the ICTY and ICTR.98 However, both ad hoc Tribunals
roundly rejected the approach taken by the ICC, particularly
insofar as it misconstrued their own practice, noting in stark terms
that “the process by which the Dyilo Chamber came to its decision
is not based on a comprehensive knowledge of the established
practice of the ad hoc Tribunals, which is justified by the
particularities of these proceedings that differentiate them from
national criminal proceedings.”99 Subsequent rulings by both ad
hoc Tribunals, including on appeal, asserted the existence of
consistent practice allowing pre-testimony interviews of witnesses
for the purpose of the better administration of justice and to reduce
any element of surprise to the defense.100 As ICTR Trial Chamber
III in the case of Karemera observed, “The practice of witness
familiarization not only poses no undue prejudice, but is also a
useful and permissible practice” and “this practice has been
sanctioned by the Tribunal’s jurisprudence.”101 In particular, the
Karemera Trial Chamber held that witness preparation has been
recognized in both ad hoc Tribunals in relation to how the content
of an interview with a witness is to be disclosed, noting:
The prosecution has developed a practice of
disclosing
“will-say”
or
“reconfirmation
statements” prior to the testimony of a witness ….
98

Karemera Decision on Witness Proofing, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T;
Milutmovic Decision on Witness Proofing, Case No. IT-05-87-T.
99
Karemera Decision on Witness Proofing, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, ¶ 8.
100
See Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73.8 (Appeal
Chamber), Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Witness Proofing (May
11, 2007) [hereinafter Karemera Decision of Appeal on Witness Proofing].
101
Karemera Decision on Witness Proofing, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, ¶¶ 10-11.
The Chamber also recalled a similar finding in the Milutinović case at the ICTY
that “there is no reason for limiting witness familiarization to the Witnesses and
Victims Support Section of the Tribunal.” Id.
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Trial Chambers have considered that will-say
statements are in conformity with the prosecution’s
obligations under Rule 67(D) of the Rules of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence which require
each party to promptly notify the opposing party
and the Chamber of the discovery and existence of
additional evidence, information and materials that
should have been produced earlier pursuant to the
Rules.
The
will-say
statement
generally
supplements or elaborates on information
previously disclosed to the Defence, but it may also
bring new elements of which the Defence was not
put on notice. Although it is not acceptable for the
prosecution to mould its case against the Accused in
the course of the trial, it must be admitted that a
witness may recall and add details to his or her prior
statements. As explained by Trial Chamber I in the
Bagosora et al. case
[…] witness statements from witnesses who
saw and experienced events over many
months which may be of interest to this
Tribunal, may not be complete. Some
witnesses only answered questions put to
them by investigators whose focus may have
been on persons other than the accused
rather than volunteering all the information
of which they are aware.
While this practice cannot be considered as
permission to train, coach or tamper a witness
before he or she gives evidence, the content of these
statements under Rule 67(D) encompasses much of
the elements described in the second component of
witness proofing in the Dyilo Decision.102
102

Id. ¶¶ 11-12. In the Milutinović case, the Trial Chamber similarly affirmed
that “discussions between a party and a potential witness regarding his or her
evidence can, in fact, enhance the fairness and expeditiousness of the trial,
provided that these discussions are a genuine attempt to clarify a witness’
evidence,” Milutinović Decision on Witness Proofing, Case No. IT-05-87-T, ¶

2009]

¶47

ROD RASTAN

293

In response, ICC Trial Chamber I, ruling on submissions
tendered by the prosecution that sought reliance on the above
pronouncements by the ad hoc Tribunals, revisited the earlier
observation of the PTC by acknowledging “. . .as has been
established by recent jurisprudence from the International Criminal
Tribunals of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, that witness
proofing, in the sense advocated by the prosecution in the present
case, is being commonly utilized at the ad hoc Tribunals.”103 The
Trial Chamber, nonetheless, went on to observe:
However, this precedent is in no sense binding on
the Trial Chamber at this Court. Article 21 of the
Statute requires the Chamber to apply first the
Statute, Elements of Crimes and Rules of the ICC.
Thereafter, if ICC legislation is not definitive on the
issue, the Trial Chamber should apply, where
appropriate, principles and rules of international
law. In the instant case, the issue before the
Chamber is procedural in nature. While this would
not, ipso facto, prevent all procedural issues from
scrutiny under Article 21(l)(b), the Chamber does
not consider the procedural rules and jurisprudence
of the ad hoc Tribunals to be automatically
applicable to the ICC without detailed analysis.104

¶48

In particular, the Chamber noted “the ICC Statute has,
through important advances, created a procedural framework
which differs markedly from the ad hoc tribunals. . .introducing
additional and novel elements to aid the process of establishing the
truth.”105 Such differences were held to include the requirement on
the prosecution to investigate exculpatory and incriminatory
circumstances equally; the scope for greater intervention by the
bench, and the unique element of victim participation.106
16.
103

Lubanga Decision on Witness Preparation for Testimony at Trial, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/06-1049, ¶ 43 (2007).
104
Id. ¶ 44.
105
Id. ¶ 45.
106
Id. The Chamber did not explain the relevance of such particular structural
differences for rendering witness proofing impermissible per se. Arguably, the
obligations of the prosecution pursuant to article 54(1) might actually render the
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¶49

The repost and counter-repost by the different courts and
tribunals on the issue of witness proofing provides a fascinating
display of doctrinal interaction between the community of
international judiciaries. At the same time, the debate indicates the
strain of fragmentary tendencies in the discernment of international
norms of criminal procedure.
¶50
Irrespective of the merits of the practice of witness proofing,
which the Chamber in any event proceeded to examine on its own
basis, the discussion raises the broader question of whether a
chamber must find justification for every aspect of its procedure
that is not expressly regulated in the Statute and Rules by resort to
secondary sources of law. Several factors suggest that the ICC will
often be called upon to regulate aspects of its criminal procedure in
ways that cannot easily be patterned on general principles arising
from national practice. This includes the particular context and
challenges of holding trials at the international level, such as: the
oft substantial lapse of time between the taking of a statement to
the moment of testimony; the relative isolation engendered by
witness protection programs; the in-court dislocation of cultural
experience for witnesses from their natural environment; the largescale and complex nature of the criminality which forms the basis
of the cases; and, above all, the need in these specific contexts to
continue to provide for fair and expeditious proceedings that are
conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused and due
regard to the protection of victims and witnesses. Establishing a
rule that would require every determination on a previously
unregulated aspect of its procedure to be based on secondary
sources of law would hamper the functions and powers of a trial
chamber to “adopt such procedures as are necessary to facilitate
the fair and expeditious conduct of proceeding” and so determine
its own procedure.107 To date chambers of the Court have not found
it necessary to do so in every instance and there is little suggestion
that they consider themselves so bound.108 Indeed, reference to

permissibility of practice witness proofing more appropriate in the context of the
ICC compared to that of the ad hoc Tribunals.
107
Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 64(3)(a). ICC Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3, Rule 134 (Sept 3-10, 2002).
108
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Prosecution's
Application for the Admission of the Prior Recorded Statements of Two
Witnesses, ICC-01/04-01/06-1603 (Jan. 15, 2009).
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Article 21 in the litigation over witness proofing arose because the
issue was initially framed in those terms by the prosecution.
¶51
Given the specific context and circumstances in which the
ICC operates, it would appear that the appropriateness of the
adoption of a particular unregulated aspect of its procedure should
ordinarily be considered on a self-standing merits-based
assessment. This should be done against the statutory requirements
that proceedings are “fair and expeditious” and “conducted with
full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard to the
protection of victims and witnesses,”109 rather than a fortiori
whether it can be discerned from principles and rules of
international law or general principles of law derived from national
laws of legal systems of the world. While recognizing the utility of
examining legal regimes and practices at the national and
international level, the Court should not be definitively bound by
them in matters of procedure. In particular, the diversity of national
practice amongst legal systems on most evidentiary matters means
that the Court will often be unable to discern general principles
that support the adoption of a particular evidentiary rule. The Court
cannot be left in procedural indeterminacy as a result and thus face
the situation of a non liquet. This would arguably defeat the very
purpose of Article 21. In this regard, ICC Rule 63 provides: “[T]he
Chambers shall not apply national laws governing evidence, other
than in accordance with Article 21[.]” Read together with its power
to adopt such procedures as are necessary to facilitate the fair and
expeditious conduct of proceeding, this suggests that the ICC is not
bound by national evidentiary laws and, rather than resorting to
Article 21 to establish a permissible rule that is otherwise
unregulated, it should only refer to secondary sources in order to
discover a general principle or rule prohibiting the adoption of a
particular procedure.110 This is not to turn Article 21 on its head,
but to distinguish where a chamber resorts to secondary sources of
109

Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 64 (2).
See the similar reasoning applied by the ICTR Appeals Chamber: “[T]he
submission that a number of national jurisdictions prohibit the practice of
witness proofing to varying degrees does not, in the view of the Appeals
Chamber, make such practice incompatible with the Tribunal’s Statute and
Rules or with general principles of law. Indeed, Rule 89(A) of the Rules
expressly provides that ‘Trial Chambers shall not be bound by national rules of
evidence.’” Karemera Decision of Appeal on Witness Proofing, Case No.
ICTR-98-44-AR73.8 ¶ 11.
110
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law as a mandatory requirement to remedy a lacuna in the Court’s
legal instruments,111 and where Article 21 serves to frame the
parameters within which the Court exercises its discretionary
power to regulate its proceedings, particularly in matters of
evidentiary procedure.112
VII.

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

¶52

In other significant developments before the ICC during
2008, on June 10, 2008, Jean-Pierre Bemba, alleged President and
Commander-in-Chief of the Mouvement de Libération du Congo,
was surrendered to the Court by the Belgium authorities following
his arrest pursuant to a warrant issued under seal by Pre-Trial
Chamber III.113 Bemba is alleged to be criminally responsible for
three counts of crimes against humanity: rape (Article 7(1)(g)),
torture (Article 7(1)(f)), and murder (Article 7(1)(a)); and five
counts of war crimes: rape (Article 8(2)(e)(vi)), torture (Article
8(2)(c)(i)), committing outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment (Article 8(2)(c)(ii)),
pillaging a town or place (Article 8(2)(e)(v)), and murder (Article
8(2)(c)(i)).114
¶53
The Prosecutor lodged two further applications for arrest
warrants during 2008, in relation to the Darfur situation, both of
which were decided in 2009 and therefore not treated herein. The
first was against Omar Al Bashir, President of the Sudan, for the
alleged commission of ten counts of genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes through members of the state apparatus,
the army and the Militia/Janjaweed in accordance with Article 25
(3)(a) of the Statute (indirect perpetration or perpetration by
means).115 The second application focused on the alleged criminal
111
Situation in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04-168
(Appeals Chamber), Judgment on the Prosecutor's Application for Extraordinary
Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I's 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to
Appeal, ¶¶ 33-42 (July 13, 2006).
112
The author would like to thank Ben Batros for helping to formulate this
conceptual distinction.
113
See Press Release, ICC, Surrender of Jean-Pierre Bemba to the International
Criminal Court, ICC-CPI-20080703-PR335 (July 3, 2008).
114
See Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-1, Warrant of
Arrest (May 23, 2008).
115
See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Case No. ICC-02/05-157, Public Redacted
Version of Prosecution's Application under Article 58 Filed on 14 July 2008
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responsibility of rebel commanders for war crimes committed
against African Union peacekeepers in Darfur on September 29,
2007, in the largest attack in a series of deadly attacks against
peacekeeping personnel and objects. Relying on one of the few
newly codified international crimes under the treaty establishing
the Court, the application focused on the prohibition as a war crime
of the intentional directing of attacks against personnel,
installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian
assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection
given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of
armed conflict.116
¶54
Also in 2008, Pre-Trial Chamber II, dealing with the
situation in Uganda, in the case of Kony et al initiated, on its own
initiative pursuant to Article 19(1) of the Statute, admissibility
proceedings.117 The Chamber held that such proceedings were
necessary considering the peace negotiations between the
Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance
Army and, in particular, the Annexure to the Agreement on
Accountability and Reconciliation which provided for the
establishment of a special division of the High Court of Uganda to
try individuals for serious crimes during the conflict. In the light of
these circumstances, the PTC held that it was appropriate to enter a
determination on admissibility “in order to ensure the proper
application of the relevant provisions concerning admissibility to
current and future proceedings in the Situation.” Accordingly, it
invited the submission of observations by the Republic of Uganda,
the Prosecutor, ad hoc counsel for the defense, which it appointed,
(Sept. 12, 2008).
116
See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Case No. ICC-02/05-162, Summary of the
Prosecutor's Application under Article 58 (Nov. 20, 2008).
117
Joseph Kony, alleged Commander-in-Chief of the Lord’s Resistance Army,
is alleged to be criminally responsible for twelve counts of crimes against
humanity: murder under article 7(1)(a), enslavement under article 7(1)(c), sexual
enslavement under article 7(1)(g), rape under article 7(1)(g), and inhumane acts
of inflicting serious bodily injury and suffering under article 7(1)(k). He is also
alleged to be responsible for twenty-one counts of war crimes: murder under
article 8(2)(c)(i), cruel treatment of civilians under article 8(2)(c)(i),
intentionally directing an attack against a civilian population under article
8(2)(e)(i), pillaging under article 8(2)(e)(v), inducing rape under article
8(2)(e)(vi), and forced enlisting of children under article 8(2)(e)(vii)). Kony is
charged together with four other LRA commanders: Vincent Otti, Raska
Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen.
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and victims who had already communicated with the Court with
respect to the case or their legal representatives.118
VIII.

CONCLUSION

¶55

As the ICC moves beyond the tenth anniversary of the
adoption of its Statute and approaches the Review Conference to
be held in 2010 it is gathering a body of jurisprudence that is
starting to define the scope of its legislative framework in a
number of important areas. The treatment of a number of these
issues by the Appeals Chamber has been central in establishing
clarity over the legal process, particularly on novel aspects unique
to the Court’s legal instrument. At the same time, the Court, as
with its ad hoc predecessors, continues to grapple with the need to
ensure that proceedings are both fair and expeditious.119
¶56
The commencement of the ICC’s first trials will no doubt
lead to a burgeoning of case-law on issues of both substantive and
procedural law in the coming years. Moreover, many issues that, as
of the end of the year, remained untested or only marginally treated
have already begun to appear before the Court in the first half of
2009. These include foundational issues such as the Court’s
complementarity regime, command responsibility, modification of
the charges once the trial has begun, and the evidentiary threshold
for a warrant application for the crime of genocide.

118

See Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-320, Decision Initiating
Proceedings under Article 19, Requesting Observations and Appointing Counsel
for the Defence (Oct. 21, 2008).
119
The duration of confirmation hearings, for example, has witnessed a
downward trend from three weeks in the case of Lubanga, to two weeks in the
larger case concerning Katanga and Ngudjolo, to five days scheduled for the
Bemba case (only four of which were eventually utilized). Nonetheless, pre-trial
proceedings remain time consuming, including at the warrant application stage,
despite the adoption of such measures as, inter alia, demanding stricter
adherence to disclosure timelines, focusing the approval of application for
participation in circumstances more directly related to the proceedings, as well
as efforts by Chambers to request the submission of in-depth analysis charts to
better enable an overview of the evidence and so facilitate the effective
management of proceedings.

